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ABSTRACT 
In the paper we test a homogenous agent version of the Montgomery's (1991) non-cooperative wage 
posting model. The inclusion of intrinsic costs, related to the uncertainty when changing the alternative 
agents are already using, alters the outcome of the model in two respects: firstly, it significantly 
prolongs the convergence-time to the equilibrium, and, more importantly, it may lead to the wage 
dispersion, irrespective of equally-productive-agent proposition, something not present in the model of 
Montgomery. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do some workers earn higher wages than others for doing similar jobs? In the 
paper we discuss the issue along a simple homogenous-agent model of Montgomery 
(1991). Employers in the model announce their wage posts in a non-cooperative game 
and workers apply to the vacancies. All bargaining power is given to employers while 
workers only direct their job search according to their preferences. All job-postings 
offer the same expected benefits to applicants, should the latter apply. However, this 
condition does not prevent employers from posting different wages. The expected 
benefits as assumed by the model are namely a self-correcting mechanism, because 
vacancies that offer lower wages attract fewer applicants and are thus more easily 
accessible than those offering higher wages, keeping expected benefits to the 
applicants equal. 
 
Although employers
1
 prefer such alternatives as to attain the highest outcome and, 
thus, tend to choose them, they face intrinsic costs, related to the uncertainty when 
changing the alternative they are already using. As a consequence, employers are not 
prone of changing their current alternatives, especially when it is expected that the 
benefit of adopting a new alternative would be quite small. Rubinstein (1998) defines 
such behavior by the tradeoff between complexity and efficiency of alternatives where 
agents (employers in our case) prefer efficient and simple alternatives.
2
 
 
We test the effects of such intrinsic costs by introducing a stochastic factor, a “noise”, 
into the original Montgomery model that affects the decision-making (wage policy) of 
employers. Then, even the homogeneous-agent model may lead to wage dispersion, 
something that is not possible in the original Montgomery model, but has been 
modeled within the framework of Burdett and Judd (1983). 
 
Paper proceeds as follows. The model is developed in the chapter following the 
introductory remarks. The third chapter brings numerical simulations with a basic 
description of the numerical algorithm reflecting the computer code used for 
simulations. Results with graphs and explanation are presented in the fourth chapter. 
The last chapter concludes. 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The model resembles a simple 22×  case from Montgomery (1991). Suppose that the 
labor market consists of two identical workers and two identically productive 
employers each having only one vacancy. Then both employers non-cooperatively 
post wages w  as to maximize their profits π  and each worker is allowed to make 
only one job application. 
 
In a non-cooperative game-setting as proposed by Montgomery workers apply to the 
first employer with probability p  and to the second employer with probability 
                                                 
1
 This is true in general but our terminology (and application) in the paper is confined solely to 
decisions taken by employers. 
2
 For the literature review on the role of behavioral studies on the decision-making, see Hirshleifer 
(2001). 
( )p−1 .3 If both agents apply to the same vacancy, then the employer randomly 
chooses one applicant while leaving the other unemployed. The following output 
matrix applies: 
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The game has three Nash equilibria ( ) ( )
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In the first case worker 1 applies to employer 1 and worker 2 applies to employer 2, in 
the second worker 1 applies to employer 2 and worker 2 applies to employer 1, and a 
mixed strategy, where both workers apply to the both employers with probability 5.0 . 
Solving for p  in a mixed Nash equilibrium yields: 
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Employers may increase probability of getting application to the vacancy by offering 
higher wage.
4
 However, higher wages attract more job applications thus causing a 
reduced probability for a particular worker to getting higher-paid job. 
 
A filled vacancy by the employer i  produces a product 
i
v  with employer i  
maximizing its profit (decision) function: 
 
( ) ( )( )( )2max 1 1
i
i i i i
w
v w p wπ = − ⋅ − −  subject to [ ] ( )0,1 , 0,1i iv w∈ ∈  (2). 
 
Second expression in (2) depicts the probability that the employer i  receives at least 
one job application. Using (1) for ip  and inserting it into the profit-maximization 
equation (2), reduces the maximization problem: 
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, given ( ),i iv w− i  (3). 
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 As workers are assumed to be homogeneous they must apply with the same probability to particular 
vacancy if they are to maximize their expected benefit. 
4
 That is to be expected in the case of differently-productive employers, where an empty vacancy of the 
more productive employer is more costly. Strictly positive first derivatives: 
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=∂−∂  prove that higher wage is associated with higher job-application 
probability. 
 Solving (3) for both employers gives us their reaction functions, that is their best 
responses to each other's wage posting strategy: 
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Wage posted by a particular employer depends on the wage posted by other employer 
and employer’s productivity level. The symmetry of both employers’ reaction 
functions implies, theoretically, that equally productive employers should offer the 
same wage rates. 
 
 
SIMULATIONS 
 
A brief outline of the algorithm applied to solving the model is as follows. The model 
is populated with two employers i  each of whom solves his optimization problem as 
given in (3). All games are iterated forward in time for 1,2,...,100t = . As given in (3) 
each employer conditions its wage selection in time 1t +  according to other 
employer’s selection in time t  simultaneously. To follow the algorithm the 
optimization problem could be rewritten as:
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, given ( ),,i i tv w− i  (3a). 
 
The decision function to be maximized in each period t  is continuous, concave, and 
differentiable on the defined convex set ( )0,1D∈  thus guarantying a maximum. 
Decision-making algorithm is based on the line search optimization and works as 
follows: 
 
Initialization: choose initial 0,i tw  and other parameter values 
Step 1: evaluate maximization function ( ), ,ki t i twπ . 
Step 2: 1, , ; 1 7
k k
i t i tw w step step E
+ = + = − . 
Step 3: if ( ) ( )1, , , , 0k ki t i t i t i tw wπ π+ − > , go to step 1, else go to step 4. 
Step 4: quit iteration and report ,
k
i tw  as the optimum wage posted by employer i  in 
time t , *,i tw . 
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 i−  stands for the not i  employer. 
After the *,i tw  is calculated, the simulation process continues in 1t +  until the 
convergence of the optimal wage time-path: * *, 1 , 0i t i tw w+ − < .
6
 
 
To prove that the convergence path exists consider the maximization problem (3a). 
Symmetry implies that both homogenous employers offer , ,i t i tw w−=  for all t . Say 
that ,i tw  and , 1i tw +  are optimum wages at time t  and 1t + , then we could rewrite the 
convergence condition to: ( ) ( )
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, corroborating a continuous, 
concave and differentiable function.  QED 
 
To allow for the intrinsic costs, the logistic (Fermi) probability function is used as a 
mechanism influencing employers' wage-setting process: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 11, 1 , , , 11 expi t i t i t i tF w w w w κ
−
−
+ +
 ← = + −   (6). 
 
Probability that the wage is regularly updated in each period t  is a function of wage 
differential and the susceptibility to the “noise” parameter, ( ]0,1κ ∈ . The smaller the 
κ  the larger the probability that employer follows its optimal strategy and vice versa. 
The rule to adopt a new wage in each period becomes: ( )( ), 1 ,i t i tran F w w+< ←  then 
, 1 , 1i t i tw w+ += , else , 1 ,i t i tw w+ = . ( )0,1ran∈  is an i.i.d. random number. 
 
Simulations are performed through the entire space of κ  (step 0.25). Results are 
averaged over 50 realizations. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Initial parameter values are set as follows: the productivity level 1 2 0.1v v= = , wage 
rates 1,0 2,0 0.0001w w= = . Simulation results are depicted on Figure 1. The figure 
depicts the iteration process of the wage policy under the entire definition space of κ  
as stated above, plus for 0.001κ = . 
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 In the sequel, we omit asterisks for the sake of clearance. 
 
Figure 1: Optimal wage time-path 
 
In the end all values converge to the analytical solution 1 2 0.05w w= = . Wage policy 
of the original Montgomery model without a “noise” is depicted on the far leftist 
curve. The curve is alike for both employers. This is as expected considering the fact 
that both are equally productive, share the same optimization problem and are not 
subject of any “noise”. 
 
The same results are also got in the modified model when the “noise” parameter κ  is 
set to almost zero. For, when ( ), 1 ,
0
lim 1i t i tF w wκ +↓
← = , irrespective of , , 1,i t i tw w +  values, 
which entails ( )( ), 1 ,i t i tran F w w+< ← . Then the wage policy is regularly updated. 
 
Figure 1 reveals that a slight increase in the “noise” parameter value, like 0.001κ = , 
changes the behavior of the model. First, it doubles the convergence time. For 
instance, the original model converged in 28t =  (far leftist curve), while even for 
0.001κ =  (second from the left) the model converged in 45t =  (for 0.25κ = (among 
the bunch of curves on the right) the model converged in 63t = ). 
 
More importantly, the inclusion of “noise” parameter that allows an “out-of-
equilibrium” decision-making might result in the wage dispersion even among 
homogenous agents, employers and workers. To show this, focus to the enlarged time 
interval 15,..., 20t =  of simulation results for κ  with the step 0.25 in Figure 2. Except 
for the original model, other wage curves 1,tw  and 2,tw  of employer 1 and 2 do not 
equal along the whole time interval, 1,2,...,100t = . The finding is similar to Burdett 
and Judd (1983) who show that the price (wage) dispersion may exist in the case of 
homogenous agents provided that some “noise” is introduced into the sequential 
search technology. 
 
 
Figure 2: Optimal wage time-path and the wage dispersion 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the paper we test a 22×  homogenous-agent version of the Montgomery model 
(1991) of the wage posting. In his paper Montgomery predicts that in such an 
environment both employers should offer equal wages due to the symmetry of their 
decision functions. However, our simulations reveal that it is also the homogeneous-
agent model that could entail wage dispersion, provided that the “noise” factor is 
included. In addition, a “noise” factor also significantly prolongs the optimal-wage-
path convergence time. 
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